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Abstract
This paper examines the e⁄ects of exclusive dealing contracts o⁄ered by an incumbent
distributor. The e⁄ectiveness of exclusive dealing contracts o⁄ered by distributors is quite
di⁄erent from those o⁄ered by incumbent manufacturers. The traditional literature has fo-
cused solely on exclusive dealing contracts made by incumbent manufacturers and has derived
multiple equilibria within homogeneous price competition models. In contrast, this paper as-
serts that exclusive dealing contracts made by a distributor generate a unique equilibrium and
that an e¢ cient entrant must be excluded under the equilibrium as long as distributors have
su¢ cient bargaining power.
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1I Introduction
The market power of the distribution sector on vertical restraints has recently become a growing
concern. The European Commission is working for a revision of the Vertical Restraints Block Ex-
emption Regulation and the related guidelines on supply and distribution agreements concerning
the increased buyer power of large retailers.1 According to the revised regulation, ￿the Commis-
sion proposes that for a vertical agreement to bene￿t from the block exemption, not only the
supplier￿ s market share (as is currently the case) but also the buyer￿ s market share should not
exceed 30%￿(European Commission Press Release, July 28, 2009). The European Commission
is now concerned that large distributors could soften competition by restricting suppliers￿deal
backed with their buying power.2 Will the mechanism of the anti-competitive e⁄ect of vertical
restraints be changed when such restraints are attempted by distributors and not by suppliers?
This paper tries to answer this question. We will demonstrate that the structure of the
game between distributors and suppliers is largely changed in the case of restraint o⁄ered by
distributors. More speci￿cally, this paper shows that exclusive dealing contracts made by an
incumbent distributor are more e⁄ective than those made by an incumbent seller or manufacturer.
In the literature, regulations regarding exclusive dealing contracts have mainly focused on
suppliers￿ contract o⁄ers. Rasumsen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) revealed
that exclusive dealing contracts made by an incumbent manufacturer (seller) may deter e¢ cient
entries. They have shown that buyers may not reject the exclusive dealing o⁄er of an incumbent
manufacturer when an entrant has to pay a ￿xed entry cost. The reason for this is that the sales
amount for a rejected buyer (or free buyer) is insu¢ cient for the entrant and cannot cover the
￿xed entry cost. Hence, there is a possibility that all buyers will accept the exclusive dealing
contract.
Recently, Fumagalli and Motta (2006) and Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) extended this issue
to cases in which a manufacturer o⁄ers exclusive dealing contracts to downstream distributors.3
As Fumagalli and Motta (2006) have stressed, if buyers are distributors, this insu¢ cient sales
amount problem does not exist. The main reason for this is that, if buyers are distributors, the
sales to a rejected buyer are su¢ cient to cover the ￿xed entry cost because the distributor can
1The new rules becomes e⁄ective in June 2010 with a one-year transitional phase.
2In France, we can ￿nd a similar reform of competition rules. In 2005, an act regarding slotting allowances
and hidden rebates was reformed. This reform provoked a debate regarding the fact that industrial pro￿ts are
concentrated in large retailers through two-part tari⁄ contracts (see also Miklos-Thal et al., forthcoming).
3Wright (2009) corrects some of analysis in Fumagalli and Motta (2006)
2sell a su¢ cient amount of the product to consumers. On the other hand, if we consider such
manufacturer-distributor relationships, we face another problem, which is that there are multiple
equilibria. There exists both an equilibrium in which an entrant is excluded (hereafter ￿exclusion
equilibrium￿ ) and an equilibrium in which an entrant is not excluded (hereafter ￿non-exclusion
equilibrium￿or ￿entry equilibrium￿ ).
The main reason for this is that an incumbent manufacturer only faces the wholesale market.
If a distributor rejects an exclusive dealing o⁄er, the incumbent does not have to care about
the retail price competition or its wholesale price o⁄er to the contracted distributor. The in-
cumbent competes with the entrant by making the wholesale price o⁄er to the free distributor
(non-captured by the exclusive contract) as low as possible and the wholesale price o⁄er to the
contracted distributor can be indeterminate (i.e., it becomes irrelevant to the pro￿t function of
the incumbent). However, the wholesale price o⁄er of the incumbent to the contracted distributor
crucially a⁄ects the result of retail price competition and the pro￿t of the free distributor. Thus,
there are multiple equilibria. If the incumbent o⁄ers a low (high) wholesale price to the contracted
distributor, the free distributor obtains high (low) pro￿t as the result of retail price competition.
If the pro￿t of the free distributor is high, the necessary compensation for the exclusive deal-
ing contract becomes too high and a non-exclusion equilibrium must be realized. On the other
hand, if the pro￿t is low, it becomes possible to o⁄er a su¢ cient amount of compensation and an
exclusion equilibrium is realized.
In contrast to the aforementioned concept, this paper shows that there exists a unique equilib-
rium in which an incumbent distributor successfully prevents the entry of an e¢ cient distributor
by o⁄ering exclusive dealing contracts to manufacturers. The crucial point is that the incum-
bent distributor engages in retail price competition. Even when a manufacturer has rejected an
exclusive dealing contract o⁄er, the incumbent distributor and the entrant distributor seriously
compete in the retail market. Thus, in our model, even the incumbent has no incentive to purchase
from the free manufacturer at a high wholesale price. Hence, the pro￿t of the free manufacturer
must be unique and the realized equilibrium must also be unique. Furthermore, if we assume
large distributors, those are distributors who have high bargaining power, the pro￿t of the free
manufacturer becomes very low. Thus, in such situations, the unique equilibrium is the exclusion
equilibrium.
Evidently, even in the literature, the previous papers have derived uniqueness by modifying
their settings. Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) and Abito and Wright (2008) have assumed a
3(slightly) di⁄erentiated goods market and have shown that a unique exclusion equilibrium exists.
On the other hand, we will show in this paper that as long as we consider an exclusive dealing
o⁄er from an incumbent distributor, a unique exclusion equilibrium exists even in a homogeneous
goods market. Moreover, Fumagalli and Motta (2006) eliminated multiplicity by assuming a
small ￿xed operation cost for distributors. They showed that if distributors cover this ￿xed cost
to operate (i.e. to compete in the retail market), non-exclusion is the unique equilibrium. Because
only a free distributor can cover the ￿xed cost and all others will exit the retail market, a free
distributor can capture a monopoly pro￿t that the incumbent manufacturer cannot compensate
for with more than two distributors. In contrast, we prove that even without a small ￿xed cost
for distributors, our result remains robust; that is, exclusion occurs as a unique equilibrium.
We can ￿nd real-world evidence that large distributors have obtained high bargaining power
in recent years. According to Miklos-Thal et al. (forthcoming), ￿large supermarket chains often
account for a high share of a manufacturer￿ s production: in the UK, even large manufacturers
typically rely on their main buyer for more than 30 percent of domestic sales. Inderst and Wey
(2006) state that some countries in the European Union are dominated by a small number of
large retailers. Furthermore, in the US, so-called mega distributors such as Wal-Mart exist and
have established a presence. Many articles have examined the strategies of Wal-Mart￿ s demanding
orders for suppliers (e.g., Moore, 1993; Norek, 1997).
Even in the economic literature, some papers have focused on such situations and have devel-
oped ￿large distributor models.￿O￿ Brien and Sha⁄er (1997) and Bernheim and Whinston (1998)
examined cases in which retailers take the initiative of wholesale contracting, e.g., retailers o⁄er
wholesale prices to suppliers. Inderst (2005) examined slotting allowances in a situation where
several manufacturers supplied a large monopolist retailer. Marx and Sha⁄er (2007) extended
the common agency model in a situation where two competing large distributors have bargaining
power over a supplier. Those papers, however, did not focus on exclusive dealing o⁄ers from larger
distributors, which is the subject of this paper. In that sense, this paper makes a contribution
to the literature by demonstrating the important implications of exclusive dealing o⁄ers made by
distributors.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the large distributor model. We show
that there exists an equilibrium of entry deterrence. Section 3 concludes the paper and presents
some policy implications.
4II The Model
We present a simple manufacturer-distributor model in which two manufacturers (M) produce
homogeneous goods and have the same technology with a constant marginal cost c. There is no
￿xed cost for production. There is one incumbent distributor (I) who faces a potential entrant
distributor (E). The marginal distribution cost of the incumbent distributor is dI and that of the
entrant distributor is dE. We assume that dI > dE; that is, the entrant is more e¢ cient than
the incumbent. Although there is no ￿xed cost for distribution, we assume that the entrant has
to pay an entry cost F to enter the downstream market. The two distributors face a demand
function, X = X(p) where p is the market retail price, and we assume that the demand function
satis￿es the standard assumptions, which ensures that dX(p)=dp < 0.
The game runs as follows. At t = 0, the incumbent o⁄ers exclusive contracts to manufacturers
and they decide whether or not to accept. S(= 0;1;2) denotes the number of signed manufacturers.
An exclusive dealing contract stipulates that a signer supplies only for the incumbent and instead
gets x as a compensation. As assumed in the related literature, this contract cannot be breached
and any commitments regarding wholesale prices or distribution margins are not included in the
contract. Moreover, the standard tie-break rule is assumed; that is, if manufacturers are indi⁄erent
about whether to sign or reject the contract, they must sign it. We only focus on simultaneous
and nondiscriminatory o⁄ers of exclusive dealing contracts. At t = 1, having observed S, the
e¢ cient entrant distributor decides whether to enter or not. The entrant enters the market when
it can obtain non-negative pro￿t, that is, if it can cover the entry cost F.
At t = 2, we have three stages. First, each active distributor o⁄ers wholesale prices to man-
ufacturers. In order to capture situations in which distributors have strong bargaining power,
we assume that these are take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers.4 Let wI denote a wholesale price o⁄er from
i = I;E.5 Second, manufacturers decide either to accept the wholesale price o⁄ers or not. Man-
ufacturers can accept two o⁄ers, because we do not assume any capacity constraints. Finally,
distributors engage in retail price competition a la Bertrand. Here we adopt the tie-break rule
as in the literature, that is, the most e¢ cient ￿rm wins the price competition if more than two
o⁄ers are the same. We look for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game and examine
4This assumption makes analysis very simple. Even if we consider more general situations, our qualitative results
do not change. We discuss this point in later sections.
5Here we do not exclude the situation in which an o⁄er from a distributor to one manufacturer is di⁄erent from
an o⁄er to another manufacturer. As will be explained below, a distributor has no incentive to make two di⁄erent
o⁄ers.
5the e⁄ect of e¢ cient entry at the downstream level.
In order to characterize the equilibrium at t = 2, we ￿rst consider the case in which S = 2. In
this case, all manufacturers have signed exclusive contracts and the entrant manufacturer cannot
enter the market. The incumbent is only one (active) distributor, and the pro￿t function of the
monopolist becomes:
￿(p;C) = (p ￿ C)X(p);
where C is the marginal cost (i.e., marginal distribution cost plus marginal wholesale payment) of
the distributor. This monopolist can obtain the monopoly pro￿t (denoted by ￿m(C)) by o⁄ering
the monopoly retail price (denoted by pm(C)). ￿m(C) and pm(C) are speci￿ed as follows:
￿m(C) = max




The equilibrium wholesale o⁄ers from the incumbent are rather obvious. Because the wholesale
o⁄ers are take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers, each manufacturer accepts the o⁄er as long as wI ￿ c. It is
optimal for the incumbent distributor to o⁄er wI = c and for all manufacturers to accept the
o⁄er. Hence, the equilibrium retail price becomes pm(c+dI) and the incumbent￿ s payo⁄ becomes
￿m(c + dI).
Next, we consider the case of S = 1. In this case, the entrant distributor enters the market and




> > > <
> > > :
￿(pi;Ci) if pi < pj or, pi = pj and Ci < Cj
￿(pi;Ci)=2 if pi = pj and Ci = Cj
0 if pi > pj or, pi = pj and Ci > Cj
;i = I;E; j 6= i;
where pi is i￿ s retail price and Ci is i￿ s marginal cost. From the pro￿t maximization of a distributor,
the reaction function of distributor i, pi(pj;Ci;Cj), i = I;E; j 6= i) becomes as follows:
pi(pj;Ci;Cj) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
pm(Ci) if pj > pm(Ci)
pj if pm(Ci) ￿ pj > Ci, Ci < Cj
pj ￿ " if pm(Ci) ￿ pj > Ci, Ci ￿ Cj
Ci if Ci ￿ pj
;i = I;E; j 6= i:





> > > <
> > > :
pm(Ci) if Cj > pm(Ci)
Cj if pm(Ci) ￿ Cj > Ci
Ci if Ci ￿ Cj
;i = I;E; j 6= i;





> > > <
> > > :
￿m(Ci) if Cj > pm(Ci)
￿(Cj;Ci) if pm(Ci) ￿ Cj > Ci
0 if Ci ￿ Cj
;i = I;E; j 6= i:
This is a standard pro￿t function under homogeneous Bertrand competition.
We now examine the optimal wholesale price o⁄er. Even in the case of S = 1, each man-
ufacturer accepts o⁄ers from distributors as long as wi ￿ c. It is possible for the incumbent
distributor to make o⁄ers to both manufactures, but there is no reason to o⁄er a wholesale price
that is strictly higher than c. Hence, the incumbent o⁄ers wI = c to all manufacturers. On the
other hand, the entrant distributor can make an o⁄er only to the manufacturer who did not sign
the exclusive dealing contract (the ￿free manufacturer￿ ), and the optimal wholesale price o⁄er
becomes wE = c. Obviously, the manufacturers accept all o⁄ers. In summary, the incumbent￿ s
optimal marginal cost is CI = c + dI, and the entrant￿ s optimal marginal cost is CE = c + dE.
Because dI > dE, the outcome of retail price competition becomes:
￿￿
E(c + dE;c + dI) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
￿m(c + dE) if c + dI > pm(c + dE)
￿(c + dI;c + dE)
= (dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI)
if c + dI ￿ pm(c + dE);
and ￿￿
I = 0. Thus, the entrant distributor will enter the market at t=1 as long as ￿￿
E ￿ F.
Even when S = 0, the outcome is the same as when S = 1. Because the two manufacturers
are free manufacturers, wI = wE = c, the incumbent￿ s cost is c + dI, and the entrant￿ s cost is
c + dE. Hence, the outcome of the retail competition is the same as when S = 1.
Using these results, we examine the equilibrium decisions at t = 0. We can see that even if
a manufacturer rejects an exclusive dealing contract, it cannot obtain any positive pro￿t under
the equilibrium wholesale o⁄er. Hence, manufacturers have no incentive to reject the exclusive
contract even if the compensation level is zero, x￿ = 0. This means that the exclusive contract
can exclude the entrant. Formally, we obtain the following result.
7Proposition 1 If a downstream incumbent ￿rm intends to exclude an e¢ cient rival by making
exclusive dealing contracts, there exists a unique equilibrium, in which the entrant must be excluded
for any level of F.
Proof. First, we examine the optimal decisions at t = 2. Because the marginal cost of a manu-
facturer, c, is a common knowledge, the optimal wholesale price o⁄er from an entrant distributor
to a free distributor is wE = c. Moreover, the incumbent distributor only has an incentive to
o⁄er wI = c to the free distributor. This means that a manufacturer cannot get any positive
pro￿t by rejecting the exclusive dealing contract. On the other hand, by accepting the exclusive
dealing contract, each captured manufacturer gets zero pro￿t, because the equilibrium wholesale
price o⁄er from the incumbent distributor is wI = c. Hence, it is indi⁄erent for a manufacturer
to accept the exclusive dealing contract or not, even if x￿ = 0, and all manufacturers sign the
exclusive contracts. As a result, the entrant manufacturer cannot enter the market for any level
of F.
The intuition of this result is as follows. In the large distributor model, rejecting the exclusive
dealing contract is not attractive for a manufacturer since it cannot sell its product at a high
price. None of distributors have incentive to o⁄er a higher wholesale price than c even for the free
manufacturer because the distributors have strong bargaining power6. Hence all manufacturers
sign the exclusive contract even if the compensation level is zero, and the entrant cannot enter
the market for any any level of F.
This result is much di⁄erent from the traditional one. The crucial di⁄erence between our
argument and the traditional one is whether or not the incumbent directly engages in retail price
competition. In the traditional literature which examined the exclusive dealing o⁄er from an
incumbent manufacturer (e.g., Fumagalli and Motta, 2006; Simpson and Wickelgren; 2007, and
Abito and Wright, 2008), the incumbent does not engage in retail price competition. Hence,
the wholesale price competition between the incumbent and the entrant is important and the
wholesale price o⁄er of the incumbent to the free distributor is crucial to the pro￿t function of
the incumbent. This implies the optimal wholesale price o⁄er of the incumbent to the contracted
distributor can be indeterminate. However, the pro￿t function of the free distributor depends upon
the wholesale price o⁄er of the incumbent manufacturer to the contracted distributor. Hence, the
pro￿t of the free distributor (and the necessary compensation level ) becomes indeterminate and
6Armstrong (2006) has used the same assumption in the two sided market context; stating that distributors (or
platforms) can o⁄er both a wholesale price to upstream ￿rms and a retail price to ￿nal consumers.
8there are multiple equilibria; entry equilibria and exclusion equilibria. On the other hand, in our
setting, the incumbent distributor engages in the retail price competition. It is optimal for the
incumbent to minimize the total cost and to o⁄er competitive retail price, which becomes the
treat price to the entrant distributor. Thus, the equilibrium wholesale price and the equilibrium
pro￿t of the free manufacturer are uniquely determined. Furthermore, we have assumed that
distributors have strong bargaining power. Thus, even the free manufacturer cannot make any
pro￿t. For those reasons, manufacturers must agree with the exclusive dealing contract even if
the compensation level is zero and the entrant cannot enter the market at the equilibrium.
III General bargaining
Evidently, the situation in which a distributor has very strong bargaining power and can make
a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er is an extreme one. Even if we relax this assumption, however, we can
have a unique equilibrium, and the entrant can be excluded under some parameters. In order to
explore this point, we assume that when S = 1, a free manufacturer has some appertaining power
and determines the wholesale price as follows:
wE = c + ￿(dI ￿ dE);
where ￿ represents the bargaining power of the manufacturer and we assume that 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. This
means that the entrant distributor￿ s cost becomes CE = wE + dE = c + dI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE).
Clearly, CE and wE are uniquely determined by the bargaining process given ￿.
On the other hand, the signed manufacturer has no chance to trade with the entrant distrib-
utor. Thus, the incumbent distributor makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er, wI = c, to the signed
manufacturer, which accepts the o⁄er. In the case of S = 1, it is possible for the incumbent
distributor to o⁄er a wholesale price even to the free distributor. However, this wholesale price
must be equal to c because the incumbent can purchase any amount of the product from the
signed manufacturer at the price c. As long as the wholesale price o⁄er of the incumbent to the
free distributor is c, the pro￿t of the free distributor does not change through the trade with the
incumbent distributor.
We should note here that the incumbent distributor cannot block the trade between the entrant
and the free manufacturer by o⁄ering a high wholesale price to the free manufacturer. Since the
manufacturer does not face any capacity constraints, it is optimal for it to trade with the entrant
even if the wholesale price o⁄er of the entrant is lower than that of the incumbent as long as the
9o⁄er of the entrant is not lower than the unit cost c. Thus, in the case of S = 1, the wholesale
o⁄er by the incumbent is c and CI is uniquely determined as CI = c + dI. From those o⁄ers, the
equilibrium pro￿t of the entrant distributor in the case of S = 1, denoted by ￿￿￿





> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
￿m(c + dI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE)) if
c + dI >
pm(c + dI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE))
￿(c + dI;c + dI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE))
= (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI)
if
c + dI ￿
pm(c + dI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE));
and the incumbent distributor gets zero because it loses the retail price competition. The entrant
distributor will enter the market at t=1 as long as ￿￿￿
E ￿ F. On the other hand, the pro￿t of





> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
￿(dI ￿ dE)X(pm(c + dI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE))) if
c + dI >
pm(c + dI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE))
￿(dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI) if
c + dI ￿
pm(c + dI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE)):
(1)
If S = 2, the signed manufacturers make zero pro￿t because they have no bargaining power
against the incumbent and the incumbent distributor o⁄ers wI = c. This means that the incum-
bent distributor has to o⁄er x￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
f to realize S = 2. In summary, as long as ￿m(c+dI) ￿ 2￿￿￿
f
or ￿￿￿
E < F is satis￿ed, the entrant cannot enter the market and the exclusion becomes a unique
equilibrium. If ￿m(c + dI) < 2￿￿￿
f and ￿￿￿
E ￿ F, two manufacturers do not sign the exclusive
contracts and the entrant enters the market. Even in this case, there is a unique equilibrium. As
explained in the previous section, wI = wE = c and the incumbent￿ s (the entrant￿ s) cost is c+dI
(c + dE) when S = 0 because the two manufacturers are free. Thus, the outcome of the retail
price competition is unique.
Next, we should check the robustness of the necessary compensation level, 2￿￿￿
f . In this
model, if one manufacturer rejects the exclusive dealing o⁄er, the incumbent distributor and
the signed manufacturer get zero pro￿t. Hence, it is necessary to block the unilateral deviation
(i.e., the rejection of the exclusive dealing o⁄er) incentive of both manufacturers, that is, it
is necessary to give the compensation ￿￿￿
f to each manufacturer. This also implies that the
sequential o⁄er of exclusive dealing contract does not change the total necessary compensation
10level, 2￿￿￿
f . Moreover, even if we consider the situations in which the agreement of exclusive
dealing contracts becomes ine⁄ective with some probabilities, the result does not change at all.
Consider an exclusive dealing contract in which all contracted manufacturers can be free and the
incumbent does not pay the compensation, x, with probability q > 0. In such situations, the
incumbent can reduce the required compensation level to 2(1 ￿ q)￿￿￿
f . The reason is as follows.
With probability q, a contracted manufacturer becomes free and becomes a competitor to the
manufacturer rejected the original exclusive dealing contract, and thus the manufacturer rejected
the original contract loses the pro￿t ￿￿￿
f . However, the incumbent distributor gets zero pro￿t
when the contracted manufacturer becomes free, that is, the expected pro￿t of the incumbent
under S = 2 becomes (1￿q)￿m(c+dI). Hence, this type of contract cannot change the necessary
condition for exclusion7. In summary, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 In the general bargaining situation, this economy realizes a unique equilibrium.
As long as the following condition is satis￿ed, the exclusion is realized under the unique equilibrium
even if F = 0.
￿m(c + dI) ￿ 2￿(dI ￿ dE)X(pm(c + dI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE))) if
c + dI >
pm(c + dI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE))
￿m(c + dI) ￿ 2￿(dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI) if
c + dI ￿
pm(c + dI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE))
Linear demand example To understand the condition of Proposition 2 clearly, let us consider
a linear demand example where the demand function is X(p) = 1￿p. When S = 2, the incumbent
distributor monopolizes the retail market with cost CI = c + dI and gets:
￿I = ￿m(c + dI) =
(1 ￿ c ￿ dI)2
4
:
When S = 1, CE = c+dI ￿(1￿￿)(dI ￿dE) and the monopoly price for the entrant distributor
becomes:
pm(c + dI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE)) =
1 + c + dI ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE)
2
:
7If we allow more sophisticated contracts, however, the necessary condition could be changed as explored by
Simpson and Wickelgren (2007). For example, if the exclusive contract can be ine⁄ective only when S = 1, the
free distributor cannot get any pro￿t and the necessary compensation level can be zero. That is, we can get the
exclusion equilibrium.
11This monopoly price is lower than c+dI if and only if f(dI ￿ dE) ￿ (1 ￿ c ￿ dI)g=(dI ￿dE) > ￿.















It is optimal for the incumbent to o⁄er x￿￿ = ￿￿￿
f . Exclusive dealing contracts are feasible to
o⁄er for the incumbent if ￿I ￿ 2x￿￿. Thus the above condition in the Proposition 2 becomes,
(1￿c￿dI)2
4 ￿ 2￿(dI ￿ dE)(
(1￿￿)(dI￿dE)￿c￿dI








By simple calculation, we can see that
(1 ￿ c ￿ dI)2
4
￿ 2￿(dI ￿ dE)(
(1 ￿ ￿)(dI ￿ dE) ￿ c ￿ dI
2
)
, ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
2(dI ￿ dE)(1 ￿ c ￿ dI) ￿ (1 ￿ c ￿ dI)
p





dI￿dE , ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ <
f(dI￿dE)￿(1￿c￿dI)g
dI￿dE . Thus, the exclusion is a unique
equilibrium if ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿.
Furthermore, we have that
(1 ￿ c ￿ dI)2
4
￿ 2￿(dI ￿ dE)(1 ￿ c ￿ dI) , ￿ ￿




1 ￿ c ￿ dI
8(dI ￿ dE)
￿
f(dI ￿ dE) ￿ (1 ￿ c ￿ dI)g
dI ￿ dE
; (5)
as long as dI￿dE ￿
9(1￿c￿dI)
8 . Hence, even when
f(dI￿dE)￿(1￿c￿dI)g
dI￿dE ￿ ￿ ￿ 1￿c￿dI
8(dI￿dE), the exclusion
becomes a unique equilibrium as long as dI ￿ dE ￿
9(1￿c￿dI)
8 .
On the other hand, if the conditions above are not satis￿ed, the entrant always enters and the
case of S = 0 must be realized.
IV Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we introduced a large distributor model in the context of exclusive dealing contracts.
A large distributor o⁄ers exclusive dealing contracts to manufacturers in order to exclude the
e¢ cient entrant distributor. Our main result is that even in the homogeneous goods market,
there exists only a unique exclusion equilibrium. The uniqueness of the equilibrium in our large
12distributor model stems from the simple fact that distributors engage in retail market competition.
They have incentives to minimize their total costs and make wholesale price o⁄ers as low as
possible. Therefore, the unique equilibrium can be realized. Moreover, if distributors have strong
bargaining power, their wholesale price o⁄ers must be low even for the only one free manufacturer.
Hence a manufacturer cannot expect a su¢ cient amount of pro￿t if it rejects the exclusive dealing
contract. This implies that the necessary compensation level can be reduced. As a result, the
incumbent distributor can capture all manufactures and the e¢ cient entrant distributor cannot
enter the market. Exclusion must be realized at the equilibrium.
As implications of anti-trust issues, we assure that the anti-trust authority should take care
of the exclusive dealing contract o⁄ered by distributors in addition to by manufacturers. Our
result supports the European Commission￿ s revision of regulations on vertical restraint, and also
encourages e⁄orts by authorities in other countries concerning large distributors￿intention to
exclude entrants by promoting vertical restraints with manufacturers, which have relatively lower
bargaining power against large distributors.
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